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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether borrowers’ home values affect their unsecured loans’ 
borrowing costs using data from a leading online peer-to-peer (P2P) platform in China. 
Taking China’s 2016 home-purchase restrictions (HPR) policy as an exogenous shock, 
we employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy to compare the before and 
after changes between homeowner borrowers from cities with and without the HPR 
policy. It is found that houseowners’ equilibrium interest rates decreased in those 
restricted cities, but No significant effect observed for borrowers without houses. Two 
economic channels are assessed, and we find the perceived collateral effect but no 
supporting evidence for the traditional pure wealth effect. Our results are robust to a 
series of alternative estimations. Furthermore, we provide evidence that reductions in 
borrowing costs are driven by lenders rather than the platform, as homeowner 
borrowers have faster speed of crowdfunding, more lenders per loan and a higher loan 
success rate. Homeowner borrowers are also found to default less ex post. Overall, our 
results contribute to the literature that government housing policy could still matter in 
an unsecured loan.  
 
Keywords: Peer-to-Peer Lending, Home-purchase Restrictions, Collateral Effects, 
Pure Wealth Effect. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: D14, G21, G28, R28  
                                                          
1
 We are grateful to Raghavendra Rau, Xuan Tian and seminar participants at Beijing Normal University-
Hong Kong Baptist University United International College, Sun Yat-sen University and Zhejiang 
University for their insight views and comments. All remaining errors are ours. 
  
1 
I. Introduction 
It is intriguing whether a borrower’s home value determines his/her online peer to peer 
(P2P) loan outcomes. On one hand, lenders shall inevitably lose their investments when 
borrowers default, as seizing borrowers’ properties is impossible in such unsecured loans. Thus, 
homeowners should not be favored in an unsecured loan market and house values should not 
affect and are irrelevant to their borrowing costs. On the other hand, soft information such as 
appearance is found to be crucial in determining the equilibrium loan results due to trust and 
other psychological reasons (Duarte, et.al, 2012). In addition, homeownerships could also be 
perceived as an indicator of a more financially trustworthy borrower, and homeowners might 
use houses as collaterals to seek for alternative funding opportunities (Michels, 2012). As a 
result, homeowner borrowers shall be impressed and favored by lenders, and an unexpected 
change in housing values would affect equilibrium outcomes even in an unsecured online P2P 
lending market. 
House prices, which influences a homeowner’s balance sheet (Banks & Tanner, 2002; 
Campbell & Cocco, 2007), are found to have considerable amplification effects in real business 
cycles via the collateral channel in many calibrated DSGE models (Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello 
& Neri, 2010; Liu, Wang & Zha 2013; Guerrieri & Iacoviello, 2017). At micro-level, housing 
price fluctuations also cause great wealth variations on household balance sheets (Disney & 
Gathergood, 2018). Tang (2006) and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) confirm that the 
wealth effect of housing is larger than other financial wealth effects when estimating the 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC), which could strongly impact households’ 
consumptions. Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) and Mian et al. (2017) shows that the significant 
and unequal consumption decrease in US from 2006 to 2009 could largely be attributed to 
mortgages and house price shocks. Besides, many other household activities will also be 
influenced by the swing of housing prices, including investment decisions (Schmalz, Sraer, 
and Thesmar, 2013), labor decisions, educational selections (Lovenheim 2011; Lovenheim & 
ReyNolds 2013), divorce rates (Farnham et al. 2011), childbirth rates (Lovenheim & Mumford 
2013; Dettling & Kearney 2014), and long-term care insurance (Davidoff, 2010).   
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Yet, literature has mixed explanations over such impacts.  On one hand, a larger housing 
value would, however, convert to a higher living expense, which discourages household 
financing and expenditure (Buiter, 2008). On the other hand, increase in housing value could 
translate to a relaxation of households’ borrowing constraints, which promote their 
consumptions (Campbell and Cocco, 2007).  
Despite the competing forces, early studies focus on secured loans, where houses are used 
as collaterals. It is still unclear whether pervious findings could be extended to unsecured loans, 
where houses are not pledged. Existing empirical findings mainly target on unsecured loans 
from corporate level. Stulz and Johnson (1985) finds that firms tend to use secured debt to 
finance profitable projects instead of unsecured ones. Booth and Booth (2006) identifies that 
firms borrowing on a secured basis from banks have less possible costs than an unsecured basis. 
Linn and Stock (2005) estimates the variations in senior unsecured debt risk premiums that 
along with new junior debt issuance. There is few research in the area of the household level, 
except for Mild et al. (2015) who estimates the risk of default for unsecured loan,  Kim (2015) 
who finds that negative house price shock will lead households to borrow large amounts of 
unsecured loan to avoid risks, and Bazley (2018) who demonstrates that a rise in house prices 
is found to have adverse effect for homeowners. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap and 
provide suggestive evidence on how households’ borrowing costs were affected by sudden 
change in their housing values. We treat China’s 2016 home-purchase restriction policies as an 
exogenous shock and use a novel transaction level data from a leading online P2P lending 
platform.  
China has witnessed an unprecedented economic growth from past few decades and 
become the second largest economy worldwide. Real estate, as a pillar industry in China, 
contributes tremendously on the rapid growth of Chinese economy and household 
consumptions. However, along with the development of real estate sector, a soaring housing 
prices has also drawn wide and serious concerns, which leads to a series of home-purchase 
restriction policies adopted by the central and local governments. Home-purchase restrictions, 
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first launched in 2010 and then in 2016, were implemented in different prefecture cities. The 
claimed rationales behind the two policy waves were different. Specifically, the 2010’s policy 
was under the context of the recovery of global financial crisis and a general boost in housing 
prices so that the government decided to apply a nearly nationwide housing purchase 
restrictions (Du & Zhang, 2015). In contrast, the government merely put the restrictions on the 
first- and second-tier cities in 2016. 
It is widely believed that housing purchase restrictions policies sent a strong signal about 
housing markets’ future prosperities in those cities. The cities with home-purchase restrictions 
after 2010 still experienced roaring housing prices as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 also shows 
that, the growth rate and housing price index of those cities increased even shaper compared 
with the cities not implementing home-purchase restriction policies in the long run. It is shown 
that the home purchase restriction policy only has long term effects on suppressing housing 
prices if their monthly growth rate does not exceed 5% (Li, Cheng, and Cheong, 2017), while 
most cities in our sample  with home-purchase restriction policies had over 5% growth rate on 
a month-to-month basis from 2010 to 2016. Therefore, due to the learning effect of the previous 
policy practice, Chinese citizens would possibly to hold a strong expectation of thriving future 
housing prices in the cities with restriction policy in 2016. 
An ideal laboratory to study households’ borrowing costs is China’s online Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) markets, since such data is much more frequent and abundant than that in typical 
household surveys.  This fosters us to investigate how interest rates in online P2P markets were 
affected by the policy. It is worthy Noted that equilibrium interest rates’ changes reflect the 
changes in how lenders access borrowers’ background information after the policy 
announcement.  In is well known that China’s P2P crowdfunding activities turn out to be an 
important channel for household micro financial activities and constitutes a vital aspect of 
China’s FinTech development. By December 2018, 6,618 online P2P platforms have been 
actively involved in business, with a value of RMB1,794.8 billion transactions in total, 
according to WDZJ, an authoritative online P2P industry portal in China.  
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Taken the 2016’s home purchase restrictions as an exogenous shock, we employ a 
difference-in-differences (DD) identification strategy to empirically disentangle the policy 
effects on households’ equilibrium interest rate in their Fintech borrowing. As the timing of 
city-wide policy announcements was different, it indeed facilities our DD identification. In 
addition, we also control for city-level time invariant confounding factors and nationwide 
macroeconomics trends, as they might be correlated with loan level outcomes. As our 
transaction-level data structure is repeated cross-sectional in nature, we further alleviate the 
endogeneity concern by incorporating a rich set of borrowers’ characteristics, as 
homeownership status and credit consequences are likely to be correlated with those individual 
level features (Ramcharan & Crowe, 2013).  
In our baseline estimation, we use a subsample of households who are houseowners and 
find that the policy significantly reduced the borrowing costs for those who lived in the cities 
with the restrictions comparing to the households who were Not policy constrained. Such 
effects do Not exist if we switch our sample to the group of borrowers who do Not possess 
homeownerships. To alleviate the concern that the observed reduction of borrowing costs is 
purely driven by the unobserved city time-varying factors, we use Non-homeowner borrowers 
in the same city as another level of the control group and estimate a triple difference-in-
differences (DDD) estimations. The above conclusion still holds. The dynamic effect show that 
such effects is persistent over our sample period. 
China has witnessed an unprecedented economic growth from past few decades and 
become the second largest economy worldwide. Real estate, as a pillar industry in China, 
contributes tremendously on the rapid growth of Chinese economy and household 
consumptions. However, along with the development of real estate sector, a soaring housing 
prices has also drawn wide and serious concerns, which leads to a series of home-purchase 
restriction policies adopted by the central and local governments. Home-purchase restrictions, 
first launched in 2010 and then in 2016, were implemented in different prefecture cities. The 
claimed rationales behind the two policy waves were different. Specifically, the 2010’s policy 
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was under the context of the recovery of global financial crisis and a general boost in housing 
prices so that the government decided to apply a nearly nationwide housing purchase 
restrictions (Du & Zhang, 2015). In contrast, the government merely put the restrictions on the 
first- and second-tier cities in 2016. 
It is widely believed that housing purchase restrictions policies sent a strong signal about 
housing markets’ future prosperities in those cities. The cities with home-purchase restrictions 
after 2010 still experienced roaring housing prices as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 also shows 
that, the growth rate and housing price index of those cities increased even shaper compared 
with the cities Not implementing home-purchase restriction policies in the long run. It is shown 
that the home purchase restriction policy only has long term effects on suppressing housing 
prices if their monthly growth rate does not exceed 5% (Li, Cheng, and Cheong, 2017), while 
most cities in our sample  with home-purchase restriction policies had over 5% growth rate on 
a month-to-month basis from 2010 to 2016. Therefore, due to the learning effect of the previous 
policy practice, Chinese citizens would possibly to hold a strong expectation of thriving future 
housing prices in the cities with restriction policy in 2016. 
An ideal laboratory to study households’ borrowing costs is China’s online Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) markets, since such data is much more frequent and abundant than that in typical 
household surveys.  This fosters us to investigate how interest rates in online P2P markets were 
affected by the policy. It is worthy Noted that equilibrium interest rates’ changes reflect the 
changes in how lenders access borrowers’ background information after the policy 
announcement.  In is well known that China’s P2P crowdfunding activities turn out to be an 
important channel for household micro financial activities and constitutes a vital aspect of 
China’s FinTech development. By December 2018, 6,618 online P2P platforms have been 
actively involved in business, with a value of RMB1,794.8 billion transactions in total, 
according to WDZJ, an authoritative online P2P industry portal in China.  
Taken the 2016’s home purchase restrictions as an exogenous shock, we employ a 
difference-in-differences (DD) identification strategy to empirically disentangle the policy 
effects on households’ equilibrium interest rate in their Fintech borrowing. As the timing of 
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city-wide policy announcements was different, it indeed facilities our DD identification. In 
addition, we also control for city-level time invariant confounding factors and nationwide 
macroeconomics trends, as they might be correlated with loan level outcomes. As our 
transaction-level data structure is repeated cross-sectional in nature, we further alleviate the 
endogeneity concern by incorporating a rich set of borrowers’ characteristics, as 
homeownership status and credit consequences are likely to be correlated with those individual 
level features (Ramcharan & Crowe, 2013).  
In our baseline estimation, we use a subsample of households who are houseowners and 
find that the policy significantly reduced the borrowing costs by 1.3% for those who lived in 
the cities with the restrictions comparing to the households who were not policy constrained. 
Such effects do not exist if we switch our sample to the group of borrowers who do not possess 
homeownerships. To alleviate the concern that the observed reduction of borrowing costs is 
purely driven by the unobserved city time-varying factors, we use non-homeowner borrowers 
in the same city as another level of the control group and estimate a triple difference-in-
differences (DDD) estimations. The above conclusion still holds. The dynamic effect show that 
such effects is persistent over our sample period. 
We then turn to the economic mechanisms that shape the results. The first channel is the 
collateral channel. The policy should relax the borrowing constraint of the borrowers who are 
houseowners and they are expected to have more favorable loan interest rates since the policy 
presents as a positive news for the P2P lenders. It is hypothesized that the home purchase 
restriction policy could be a positive signal sent by local governments, since the 2010’s 
restriction policy was targeted but failed to suppress high housing prices. We construct an 
indicator for either mortgage or car loan and further differentiates homeowner households into 
the constrained and unconstrained ones. It is shown that constrained homeowner borrowers did 
experience a more salient reduction in their borrowing costs for various econometric 
specifications, based on lenders’ impression of the policy shock. We also test the city variations, 
as the negative effects of P2P borrowing costs could be more pronounced in cities with good 
macroeconomic condition since these cities’ house value might have a stronger appreciation 
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potential. We proxy various local housing appreciation potential using variables such as local 
GDP, population and real estate investment growth rate to test the validity of the perceived 
effect hypothesized above. Our results suggest that houseowners that from cities with better 
past economic performances enjoyed a more reduction in their equilibrium interest rates. 
The second possible channel could be the pure wealth effect channel argued by the 
literature. Households may borrow more and consume more as they feel richer and willing to 
bear a higher borrowing cost (Campbell & Cocco 2007; Case, Quigley, & Shiller 2013). To 
empirically test channel, we use borrowers’ age as a proxy variable and the DDD results does 
not support this effect. 
We carry a series of test to show the robustness of our results. We first adopt an 
instrumental variable approach, as the choices of restricted cities were Not random. We instruct 
cities’ land supply and run the difference-in-differences instrumental variable (DDIV) 
estimation. The previous results that people from restricted cities enjoy a reduction in interest 
rates still hold. 
Furthermore, we utilize the relief of home purchase restriction policy that announced and 
implemented in 2014 to substantiate our arguments. Both our previous DD and DDD results 
are reversed, which suggests that our baseline conclusions should be generalizable. Though a 
bunch of personal characteristics have been controlled, there could still be further endogeneity 
concerns, as unobserved personal characteristics might be omitted and bias our previous 
estimates. To tackle this valid challenge, we explicitly add individual fixed effects, that is, we 
focus on borrowers that showed in our transaction records before and after the policy 
announcement. As a result, individual time-invariant characteristics are controlled. The 
conclusions still hold for both the 2016 policy restriction and 2014 policy relief. In addition, 
we winsorize over borrowing interest rates and loan amount for extreme observations and 
assign weights for the number of observations in different cities for concerns that the numbers 
of observations in different cities is unbalanced.  Both results are robust.  
Admittedly, our results are all equilibrium loan interest rates that formed by both borrowers 
and lenders in the P2P market, and we hypothesize such reduction in interest rate is mainly 
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driven by the lenders rather than the internal algorithm of the P2P platform. To answer this 
question, we further isolate the lenders’ reactions. In particular, we test how the speed of 
crowdfunding, number of investors per loan and the probability of a successful funding were 
affected after the restriction policy. All results still indicate that houseowner borrowers residing 
in cities that implemented the restrictions were more welcome by lenders. Finally, we isolate 
the borrowers’ behaviors and test borrowers’ actual post performance after the shock and find 
that P2P borrowers have 0.1% less defaults after the 2016 home-purchase release policy, which 
confirms the advantages that treated houseowners might achieve through the perceived house 
value variation. 
Our study contributes to two strands of current literatures. Firstly, it explores the housing 
wealth effect from a new perspective, which demonstrates the household credit access to 
unsecured small loans. Existing studies have examined the impact of the asset value on 
household consumption, investment, and borrowing activities by taking the secured loans into 
their consideration (Mian, Rao, & Sufi, 2013; Schmalz, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2013; Mian & Sufi, 
2018). Along with the development of the micro-loan market in China, an increasing number 
of households choose to borrow from the P2P market and their activities gradually attract more 
attention from researchers (Lin and Viswanathan, 2015; Li, Liu & Tian, 2018). This study 
complements the effect of housing value fluctuation literatures over the government home-
purchase restriction policy shock and try to build the causal relationship between the housing 
price variations and borrowing activities in the P2P market.  
Secondly, our study replenishes P2P crowdfunding literatures by standing on the supplying 
side of the market through the P2P market mechanism in China. Recent empirical literature 
already touched the determinants of P2P borrowing costs and the impact of economic shocks 
on P2P activities. Age, income, positive financial prospects and housing tenure are found to be 
significant in determining online borrowing costs in Del and Young (2006)’s research. Michels 
(2012) finds that volunteer and unverifiable disclosures significantly lessen borrowing costs in 
p2p lending platform. Braggion, Manconi, and Zhu (2018) recognizes the relationship between 
tightening loan-to-value caps from banks and increasing borrowing loan amount from P2P 
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market. Li, Liu, and Tian (2018)’s study identify that policy uncertainty negatively affects 
households’ access to small loans in P2P lending platform. Ramcharan and Crowe (2013) 
further considered housing ﬂuctuations could have a significant influence on P2P lending credit 
availability. Based on the background of 2008 financial crisis, they found that the declining 
housing price will make houseowners face lower funding success rates, higher interest rates, 
greater credit rationing, and quicker loan delinquency.  
We emphasize on how P2P borrowers and investors respond to the new information 
reflected in the housing policy shock. Our research echoes the Ramcharan and Crowe (2013)’s 
study and further confirms the relationship between the house price fluctuation and P2P credit 
availability, but our identification is different. This study targets on the home-purchase 
restriction polices from different cities, which is positively related to the housing price and 
could be considered as external shock because of the information asymmetry between the 
government and the housing market. Moreover, the market mechanism of the US P2P lending 
is different from the one in China. Renrendai P2P lending in China employ the posted-price 
mechanism instead of auction model used by Prosper.com before 2010. Under posted-price 
mechanism, the borrowing interest rate and amount are set by borrowers, while investors only 
voice their opinions by specifying the investment amount and duration. Our research is 
different from Braggion, Manconi, and Zhu (2018) that their study mainly focused on the 
causal relationship between increasing banking mortgages down payments and rising 
borrowing loan amount from P2P market. While our study targets on how the house purchase 
policy affect houseowners’ P2P borrowing costs. In addition, their identification is from the 
demand sides that the tightening mortgage down-payment requirement leads P2P borrowers to 
increase higher borrowing amount. Our study targets on equilibrium interest rates and estimate 
the effect from lender’s perceptive. We also support the house wealth effect through the 
borrowing collateral channel in P2P platform and exploit diverse house wealth effects of 
heterogeneity in household-level and city-level. 
  
10 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical foundation 
of the study. Section III describes the data and summary statistics. Section IV explains the 
estimation model and results, Section V concludes. 
II. Theoretical Foundation 
Previous studies generally identify the housing wealth shock by measuring how those shocks 
affect housing return. For example, Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) believes that local Economic 
growth is an important wealth effect that stimulates residential household level activities. 
While, other researchers track the effects of government policies on households’ behavior, like 
the important roles that monetary policy play in propagating the shock transmission through 
the credit channel (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; Benmelech & Bergman, 2012; Iacoviello, 2005; 
Kaplan et al., 2018). Tax policy and credit supply expansion policy embrace the similar effects 
(Sommer & Sullivan, 2018). Empirical evidences are found that households’ debt and 
consumption responded actively to U.S tax policy (Souleles, 1999), and the effects for debt 
were particularly strong for those who were liquidity unconstrained (Agarwal et al., 2007). Di 
Maggio & Kermani (2017) studies the heterogeneous impact of banking deregulations on 
different states in the U.S. This exogenous variation of credit supply due to anti-predatory 
lending contributed to the local house prices and employment rate. Cai (2016) also indicates 
that the implications of agriculture insurance provision raises household borrowing size while 
decreases loan interest rates for Chinese rural households  
The mechanism that drives the bond between the swings of the house value and household 
consumptions and decisions is widely explained through two major assumptions: pure wealth 
effect and borrowing collateral effect (Sinai & Souleles, 2005; Cooper, 2013; Berger, 2015, 
Cloyne et al, 2019). The pure wealth effect considers that the house is one type of financial 
asset, the rising house prices increase households’ Nominal housing wealth, households may 
borrow more and consume more as they feel richer (Campbell & Cocco 2007; Case, Quigley, 
& Shiller 2013). However, Nominal wealth is Not real wealth (Sinai & Souleles 2005; Buiter 
2010). Because the increase in the housing value may offset by the increase in the future rental 
cost, the pure wealth effect should be obvious for the one with short horizon. Many studies 
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examine the pure wealth effect through age profile. Old homeowners are regarded as the cohort 
with short horizon, they may expect to sell the house and exit the housing market in the near 
future and convert the Nominal wealth to real wealth. In contrast, young home owners have 
the long horizon, the Nominal wealth would be offset by future rental cost. As a result, the pure 
wealth effect can be tested by looking at the heterogeneous effect with respect to age (Campbell 
& Cocco 2007, Attanasio et al., 2009, Mian & Sufi, 2011). Gan (2010) studies the relationship 
between house value and credit card spending in Hong Kong, and find that pure wealth effect, 
which is identified by looking at how the consumption respond to the house value shock across 
households with different number of houses, can partly explain the relationship. Households 
without borrowing constraints could benefit from the pure wealth effects captured by their 
lifetime budget constraints. The canonical certainty-equivalent life-cycle model, on the 
contrary, suggests an invariant household behavior after predictable future income fluctuations 
(Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954; Carroll, 2001: Friedman, 2018).  
However, Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) and Buiter (2010) questioned about the pure wealth 
effect and stated that the effect of housing appreciation or depreciation on the net wealth of the 
house owners is ambiguous since housing wealth should be treated as both an asset and an 
expenditure good. A complex mechanism is included behind the housing wealth changes for 
house owners and Non-house owners.  For instance, Cho (2011) shows that housing price 
fluctuation would work in opposite directions for household with house and without house.  
Therefore, many research studies the relationship between house prices and Economic 
activities concentrating on the borrowing collateral channel (Guerrieri & Iacoviello, 2017). 
Housing value makes up the greatest part of the household’s portfolio and could be the largest 
type of collateral. As the relax to credit market would increase the borrow demand (DeFusco 
2017), the collateral effect implies that the value of collateral would increase along with the 
housing price appreciation, so that the increased collateral value would decrease the borrowing 
cost, especially for households who are experiencing a borrowing constraint (Campbell & 
Cocco 2007). Aoki et al. (2004) explain the effect of housing value on household consumption 
via credit market by considering credit frictions in their general equilibrium model. The 
  
12 
collateral channel works by amplifying and propagating monetary policy shocks on housing 
demand and consumption. Iacoviello (2005) distinguish the effect of different type of shocks 
and theoretically prove that positive demand shock improves the household or firm’s debt 
capacity and increase the consumption and investment. A number of empirical evidences show 
that the housing wealth impact the borrowing consumption via collateral channel.  Cooper 
(2013) finds the collateral channel, instead of wealth effect channel, could explain the 
relationship between the Non-housing consumption and housing value by looking at the 
heterogeNous effect across groups of households with different level of borrowing constraints. 
Cloyne et al (2019) uses a rich dataset to verify the collateral channel by examining the 
heterogeneous effect of LTV, age, income and income growth on the elasticity of borrowing 
to housing price. They find the elasticity is strongly respond to high LTV ratio, even controlling 
for the other 3 factors, suggesting collateral channel can be used to explain their findings of 
positive relationship between housing value and loan amount. A rise in housing values 
translates to an increase in collateral values and thus makes households’ borrowing constraints 
Non-binding. This encourages leverage and consumption through the classic consumption 
Euler equation. Later studies confirm that housing wealth helps to alleviate credit constraints 
for household and even of their potential investments (Schmalz, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2013; 
Corradin & Popov, 2015). Corradin and Popov (2015) echoes the previous research that 
housing wealth is able to lessen credit constraints for potential entrepreneurs based on the 
collateral channel.  
These theories allow us to explore the house wealth effect and the heterogeneity of the effect 
by taking advantages of the quasi-natural experiment of the home-purchase restriction based 
on the sample of Chinese P2P platform. The effect of the home-purchase restriction on Chinese 
P2P borrowers’ activities could be explored by the identification of the channel of the house 
wealth effect, including the pure wealth effect and the borrowing collateral effect. The test of 
the heterogeneity of the effect could further exploit the mechanism that how house-level and 
city-level characteristics influence the house wealth effect. 
III. Institutional Background 
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House-purchase restriction (HPR) policy has long been acknowledged for its short-term 
rather than long run effectiveness in controlling housing prices (Yang, 2018).  The policy 
could be especially pertinent to China, as real estate valuation accounts for more than two 
thirds of households' wealth. A healthy housing market, one of the pivotal growth drivers of 
China’s economy, has far-reaching implications for not only individuals but also the national 
economy. HPR policy normally stipulates the maximum number of houses a person could 
purchase; or it could require a minimum down payment ratio, mortgage interest rate, and 
person’s residency status (namely Hukou in Chinese) in certain areas2. In addition, local 
governments sometimes attach certain minimum periods an owner must hold years before 
resale, which disincentivizes speculative purchase (Wang 2017, Deng and Zheng 2018). In 
this section, we discuss some institutional background regarding the 2010 HPR policy, the 
2014 HPR relief policy and the 2016 HPR tightening policy respectively. 
The 2010 HPR Policy 
In response to 2008’s global financial crisis, the Chinese government implemented a bunch 
of expansionary policies, and loosening mortgage loans turned to be a nature consequence of 
banks’ excessive funding, and China’s housing market became thriving (Zhang, 2009). To 
stem the soaring housing prices, both the central and local governments rolled out a series of 
restriction policies. On April 17, 2010, the central government announced “Notice of the 
State Council on Resolutely Curbing the Soaring of Housing Prices in Some Cities” (国务院
关于坚决遏制部分城市房价过快上涨的通知). Soon after, Beijing municipal government 
issued a detailed HPR policy in response to State Council on April 30, where each family 
could only purchase one new house.3 Consequently, a total of 40 major cities including 16 
                                                          
2
 Authority could require the minimum years that a homebuyer must work in the restricted city. Proofs such as 
social security or income tax payment must be shown when purchasing the house in cities implementing the 
HPR policy. 
3
 Sun and etc. (2013) discussed the details of Beijing’s HPR policy that each family with Beijing Hukou can own 
a maximum of two homes while families without local Hukou are not allowed to buy any more only if they provide 
documents to prove their income tax payment and social security contributions for straight five consecutive years. 
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first-tier and second-tier cities (Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, Tianjin etc.) 
initiated HPR policies. It was considered as the most strict and wide-range housing restriction 
policy in China (Du and Zhang, 2015). As a result, speculation activities on housing market 
were suppressed but the HPR was not successful in cooling down people’s expectation about 
the bright future of the housing market. Many newly sold apartments remain in high vacancy, 
showing that buyers had high expectation on future capital gains. IMF’s global financial 
stability report also forecasted an even greater run-up in housing prices in some areas, which 
could cause financial instability (IMF, 2011). Thus, the authorities’ MPR policy was only 
effective in short run, but could induce a sharper increase in expected valuation of houses in 
the long term. Panel B in Figure 1 shows the house prices rebounded in 2012 and increased to 
a historical level in 2014. 
The 2014 HPR Relief Policy 
Although the implementation of 2010 restriction policies curb the overheated housing 
prices within a short time, the strong expectation of investors on the housing market 
prompted the property market to rebound gradually in 2012 and remained steady upsurge in 
2013. Yet in 2014, high house inventories raised extra attention and an alarming Economic 
slowdown emerged thereby residential property market receding (Cao et al., 2015). Housing 
prices started to decline in an increasing number of cities while the residential property 
inventories have increased sharply.4 China’s National Bureau of Statistics showed that prices 
for newly built homes fell broadly in July 2014 and the weakness spread to more cities, 
suggesting a downward trend of the property market (New York Times, 2014).5 Since June 
26, 2014, Hohhot stepped first to loosen the local property market restrictions. Hangzhou, 
Jinan, Nanning and more than 30 cities quickly followed up. As of August 16, only 5 of the 
46 cities in China, namely Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Sanya, did not 
relieved the HPR policy.  
                                                          
4
 See from http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-10/31/content_2773645.htm for details 
5
 See from https://cn.nytimes.com/business/20140818/cc18home/zh-hant/ for details 
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The 2016 HPR Tightening Policy  
Policies released by the central government in the early 2016, according to the Guardian, 
plainly sent a positive signal to the market as it set destocking houses as the main task.6 
However, this led to an overwhelmingly optimistic expectation from investors and speculators 
to enlarge spending on houses. The "China housing bubble" came back to a headline-making 
theme in 2016, thereby local governments further tightening restriction policies, particularly 
towards ‘speculative’ housing purchases, to moderate property price inflation. Different from 
the 2010 HPR policy, the central government delegated the power of policymaking on house 
restrictions to local governments rather issuing any official support documents in advance.7 It 
was considered as a complete shock to the market. On May 27, 2016, Shanghai surprisingly 
announced the implementation of restriction policy by increasing the number of work years 
from two to five for non-local residents. Following by Hangzhou and Beijing, a total of 21 
cities intensively proclaimed to tighten or add new locations or districts into the restrictive 
areas during the National Holiday.8 In Hangzhou, before the HPR policy announcement at 
17:00 on the 18th September, the housing sale record displayed no more than 700 deals. Yet 
until 00:00 in that evening, this figure had risen to 3089, among which 2859 deals were located 
in the restrictive areas.9 The restriction policy shock was entirely out of people’s expectation, 
which validates our shock-based analysis in section V.  
IV. Data and Summary Statistics 
                                                          
6
 See from http://www.guandian.cn/blogComment/20160111/169710.html 
7
 See from https://www.reuters.com/article/idCNL4S1E71D5 for the detailed policy list with regard to the 
housing market in 2016. 
8
 The 21cities include Beijing, Chengdu, Dongguan, Foshan, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Jinan, 
Langfang, Nanchang, Nanjing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Tianjing, Wuhan, Wuxi, Xiamen, Zhengzhou, 
Zhuhai. 
9
 The normal business hour of the property transaction center was extended until 0:00 on that day to facilitate 
last minute trading. See from http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/2016-09-19/doc-ifxvyqvy6737641.shtml for 
details 
 
  
16 
The empirical analysis is based on the household-level data collected from Renrendai, one 
of the largest P2P online lending platforms in China. Our sample consists of all P2P funded 
loans from January 2016 to July 2017, 9 months before and after October 2016, the month with 
a bunch of announcements of the home-purchase restriction policies. The household residing 
in the 21 cities (Table 1) which adopted home-purchase restriction are attributed in the 
treatment group while others are in the control one. The P2P sample includes funded borrowers’ 
borrowing interests, amount, number of lenders, duration of the funding process, as well as 
their individual characteristics. To summarize, our sample includes 249,309 households, of 
which 107,699 household has house and 141,612 has No any house properties. For 
houseowners, 32,702 of them are in the treatment group where home-purchase restriction 
policies are adopted while 74,997 of them are in control regions.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics of the key variables for the period January 2016 to 
September 2016 before the announcement of home-purchase restriction policies.  Gender is a 
dummy variable with one is female and zero is male. Marriage is a dummy variable with one 
is married and zero otherwise. Age indicates the age of the borrower. Salary is a variable 
indicating a borrower’s monthly income level, where n=0 represents whose wage is No more 
than 1000 RMB,   n=1 means monthly income is between 1000-2000 RMB, n=2 means 
monthly income is between 2000-5000 RMB); n=3 means monthly income is between 5000-
10000RMB; n=4 means monthly income is between 10000-20000RMB; n=5 means monthly 
income is between 20000-50000 RMB; n=6 means monthly income is above 50000 RMB. 
Education is a variable indicating the education level of borrowers, where n=0 (if the borrower 
is high school certificate and below), n=1 (if the borrower is college-degree holder), n=2 (if the 
borrower is university- degree holder), n=3(if the borrower is with postgraduate degree and 
above). Work years is a variable showing the working experience of borrowers, where n=0 (if 
the working experience is No more than 1 year), n=1(if a borrower has 1-3 years’ working 
experience), n=2 (if a borrower has 3-5 years’ working experience), n=3 (if a borrower has 
more than 5 years’ working experience). Car is a dummy variable with one has car and zero 
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otherwise. Job position is a dummy variable with one working for salariats and zero otherwise.  SOE is a dummy variable with one working for state-own companies and zero otherwise.  Loan 
is a dummy variable with one having house loan or car loan and zero otherwise. 
Based on the characteristics of the P2P borrowers from the sample, the treated houseowners’ 
average borrowing interests (10.26%) are significantly lower than that of the controlled 
houseowners (10.29%). Meanwhile, the average loan size (98000 RMB), borrowing duration 
(11.21 hours), and number of lenders (130.1) for the treated borrowers are significantly higher 
than those of controlled houseowners, which are 87,000 RMB, 9.818 hours, and 113.5, 
respectively. Also, the treated region borrowers exhibit the differences with more females 
(0.299 versus 0.311), less marriage (0,756 versus 0.763), younger age (37.51 versus 38.36), 
and higher education level (1.270 versus 1.392), shorter working experience (2.044 versus 
2.161 years), loan percentages (62.4% versus 53.9%), stable salary payment percentages (0.176 
versus 0.133), and the average amount of salary (3.941 versus 3.289) compared to the 
borrowers from the control region. The treated regions have significantly higher GDP growth 
rate (9.1% versus 8.5%), population growth rate (0.6% versus 0.3%), real estate investment 
growth rate (12.9% versus 1.7%), and residential investment growth rate (14.5% versus 9.20%), 
as well as lower wage growth rate (9.4% versus 10.5%) than the control regions.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
V. Estimation Strategies and Results 
The progressively implementation of the home-purchase restriction policies introduced 
variations in house wealth across time periods, cities, and household borrowing activities. 
According to these variations, we use both DD and DDD estimations in the empirical analysis. 
5.1 The Impact of the 2016 Home-purchase Restriction on Houseowners 
Common Trend Analysis 
To analyze the how home-purchase restriction affect P2P borrowing costs, we estimate the 
common trend assumptions for the pre-policy trend, which is defined as four quarters before 
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September 26, 2016, in the following regression to examine whether DD is an applicable 
approach for our study: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡   
(1) 
In the regressions, i, r, t are borrower, city, and month indices, correspondingly. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 
is P2P funded interest of the borrowing activities. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  indicates quarterly trends 
before September 26, 2016. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟 is a dummy variable with one for the cities implementing 
2016 home-purchase restriction while zero otherwise. This test tracks for four quarters, three 
quarters, two quarters, and one quarter before the announcement date of home-purchase 
restriction policy in each city, respectively. City, month*year, job characteristics (office_type, 
salary, office_size) fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered 
at city level. Individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, graduation), loan 
amount, and city trend as selected as control variables. As presented in Table 4, houseowners 
were in a similar trend for borrowing interests before the announcement of home-purchase 
restriction in 2016, we could conclude that the common trend assumption is valid since all the 
interaction terms, 𝛽3 , are insignificant, which demonstrates that there is a parallel trend 
between the city with and without implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction before this 
policy shock. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
5.2 DD and DDD Analysis for houseowners 
Based on the common trend assumption, we could further test the effect of home-purchase 
restriction on the houseowners through the following DD and DDD model: 
   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡                                             (2)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2016𝑖 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒   +𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡    (3) 
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where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 is an indicator equal to one for treatment regions after the 2016 policy 
shock and zero otherwise. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡  is P2P funded interest of the borrowing activities. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟𝑡 indicates various control variables including borrowing amount and individual 
characteristics, including gender, married, age, work years, and education. The dependent 
variable is borrowing costs. Treatpost_2016 is defined as 1 for cities after implementing 2016 
home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. Has_house is defined as 1 for P2P household with 
house and 0 otherwise. 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents a full set of city, month, year, and job characteristics 
fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the city and month*year level to account for any 
correlations of the error terms within each firm.  
From DD results shown in Table 5, we could further identify that the treated houseowners’ 
P2P borrowing interest rates drop more significantly rather than those of control regions after 
the announcement of home-purchase restriction in their cities. This outcome means that treated 
houseowners could tend to achieve 1.3% borrowing cost reduction in the P2P platform since 
lenders perceive that the announcement of home-purchase restriction indicates a positive signal 
for treated houseowners. We could also find that the P2P borrowing interest rates for treated 
households without house has no significant differences compared to those of control regions 
after the announcement of home-purchase restriction in their cities. As a result, unlike 
houseowners, lenders could not perceive such an effect on Non-houseowners since their 
financial situation will not be affected by the announcement of the policy or the effect is 
ambiguous. This estimation result also supports that the lower borrowing cost for treated 
houseowners is merely due to the house value variation instead of city trend variation.  
Following the spirit of Cai (2016), we further implement the following DDD model to 
confirm the results using the whole sample (houseowners and Non-house owners). This DDD 
framework aims to control for potential city-specific effects in our study (Cai, 2016), since 
some cities might have some unique potential trends during the sample period and factors other 
than the policy shock could affect the result. Based on this estimation, we target on the 
differences between houseowners in the treated regions and the control regions by considering 
the differences in Non-houseowners before and after the shock. From Table 5, we confirm the 
previous research results that the DDD interaction term for interest of the borrowing is 
significantly negative. This outcome shows that treated houseowners could experience 2.6% 
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decrease of interest rates after the shock compared with all the other households since their 
house value variation could be perceived by the P2P lenders.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
5.3 Channels of the House Wealth Effect on Borrowing Outcomes 
Since the home-purchase restriction will lead to a rising housing price in those treatment 
regions, which represents a higher house wealth for the borrowers with houses. To identify the 
channel of house wealth effect in our study, we conducted the following DD and DDD model 
to test the impact of the home-purchase restriction on Non-houseowners. According to the 
theories discussed in Section II, the channel of the effect of house value swings on household 
consumptions and decisions are generally explained through pure wealth effect or borrowing 
collateral effect (Sinai & Souleles, 2005; Cooper, 2013; Berger, 2017; Cloyne et al, 2019). The 
pure wealth effect means that the rising house prices increase real housing wealth for 
households, which encourages households borrow more and consume more as they feel richer, 
especially for elder people (Campbell & Cocco 2007; Case, Quigley, & Shiller 2013). The 
collateral effect concentrates on lenders’ perceptions and indicates that the value of house 
collateral would increase along with the housing price appreciation. The rising collateral value 
would be considered as a positive signal by lenders and would further decrease the borrowing 
cost, especially for households who are facing borrowing or collateral constraints (Campbell 
& Cocco 2007). 
In order to examine the channel of house wealth effect in our estimation, we consider the 
financial constraints using the following a DDD model: 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑟 +𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡  (5) 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2016𝑖 ∗                        ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽4ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡  (6) 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑟 is a dummy variable indicates that whether household has an existing loan (car 
or house loan). One is with loan and zero represents without loan. The definitions of other 
variables are the same as equation (2). 
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The results from Table 6 demonstrate that houseowners with financial constraints experience 
a stronger impact from the home-purchase restrictions, with 6.5% reduction of the borrowing 
costs. This result matches the existing study in the collateral channel that houseowners with 
financial constraints involve in a more obvious health wealth effect (Cooper, 2013; Corradin 
& Popov, 2015; Cloyne et al., 2019).  
Most existing literature studies the pure wealth effect through age profile (Campbell & 
Cocco 2007; Attanasio et al. 2009; Mian & Sufi 2011). They find that the pure wealth effect 
can be tested by looking at the heterogeneous effect with respect to age. As a result, our study 
further use age as an interaction term in the DDD model to test the pure wealth effect as follows: 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡   (7)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2016𝑖 ∗         ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽4ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 (8)   
The definitions of the variables are the same as equation (2). The insignificant research result 
from Table 6 shows that there is no strong correlation between age and the effect of policy 
shock. Therefore, the pure wealth effect is not appropriate in explaining the house wealth effect 
of the study.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
We further explore the housing value collateral effect through city variations in housing 
prices. Since the cities with good macroeconomic condition tends to have a stronger 
appreciation potential in house market. We proxy various local housing price appreciation 
potential using variables such as GDP, population, and real estate investment growth rate to 
test how houseowners from cities with heterogenous economic performances being perceived 
in P2P market after the shock. The following DDD model was applied:  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 +                𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 (4)    
Where city characteristics indicates city macro-economic data, including 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 , 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖, and 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖  represent three- city GDP growth rate, city 
population growth rate, and city residential investment growth rate, respectively. The 
definitions of other variables are the same as equation (2). Results from Table 6 demonstrate 
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that treated houseowners’ P2P interest rate has a significantly negative relationship with their 
residential city’s GDP growth rate, population growth rate, and residential investment growth 
rate. This result could be summarized that the better economic situation of the city, the greater 
housing collateral value could be perceived by lenders and finally lower borrowing costs that 
treated households could enjoy in their P2P borrowing activities.  The result matches the study 
from Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) that local economic growth is a significant wealth effect that 
stimulates residential household activities.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
In sum, based on the signs of home-purchase restriction, the increasing housing value 
perceived by lenders as more collateral advantages, help treated P2P borrowers, especially the 
ones with financial constraints, reduce the borrowing costs by 6.5% through the borrowing 
collateral effect.  
Dynamic Effects  
The release of the 2016 house-purchase restriction policy may impact household borrowing 
activities for a certain period. Furthermore, the magnitude and the significance of the effect 
could vary over time. Through the following regression, our study estimates the dynamic effect 
of the 2016 house-purchase restriction policy on household P2P borrowing activities to check 
those dynamic possibilities.  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡  (9) 
where 𝐷𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 contains a set of quarter dummies before and after the 2016 house-
purchase restriction policy. 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents a full set of city, month* year, and job 
characteristics fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the city level to account for any 
correlations of the error terms within each firm. The definitions of other variables are the same 
as equation (2). 
The results in Figure 2 indicate that the effect of house-purchase restriction policy on 
houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates becomes significant after the shock. The impact of 
the shock persists for the rest of four quarters of the post period, which shows that lenders’ 
perception on this policy shock lasts for at least four quarters after the shock. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
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VI. Robustness Check  
6.1 The Instrument Variable Approach 
Following the spirit of Saiz (2010) and Graham (2018) that variation in house prices as 
predicted by the local housing supply, we use city land supply as the instrumental variable for 
the housing price variations. The city land supply directly affected housing price and then the 
implementation of the house purchase restriction policies. It is, however, unclear that how city 
land supply affects P2P borrowing/lending behaviors because this instrument captures only the 
land supply which is based on the geographic situation of the city. Thus, the land supply our 
instrument should reasonably satisfy the exclusion restriction. Table 8 reports the two-stage 
regression results. Column (1) reports the second-stage regression results on P2P borrowing 
costs. The marginal effect (coefficient estimates) on the instrumented treatpost_2016 is 
negative and significant, suggesting that 2016 home purchase restriction policy leads to a lower 
borrowing costs for the treated groups.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
6.2 The Impact of the 2014 Home-purchase Release on Houseowners 
Also, we use the relief of home purchase restriction policy that announced and implemented 
in 2014 to substantiate our arguments. Before the analysis of the 2014 home-purchase relieve 
and its impact on P2P borrowing costs, we estimate the evolution of houseowners in the 
treatment and control groups before the policy shock. Based on the same methodology as the 
2016 shock, we could conclude from Table 9 that the common trend assumption is valid since 
all the interaction terms, 𝛽3, are insignificant. 
We further test the effect of home-purchase release on the houseowners through the following 
DD and DDD model:   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2014𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡                                                                 (10)   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2014𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2014𝑖 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 +   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 +  𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡   (11) 
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where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2014𝑖 is an indicator equal to one for treatment regions after the 2014 policy 
shock and zero otherwise. The definitions of other variables are the same as equation (2). 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents a full set of city, month, year, and job characteristics fixed effects, with standard 
errors clustered at the city and month*year level to account for any correlations of the error 
terms within each firm.  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
From DD and DDD results shown in Table 10, we could identify that the treated 
houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates increase significantly rather than those of control 
regions after the announcement of home-release restriction in their cities. This outcome means 
that treated houseowners could tend to achieve a higher borrowing cost to crowdfund in the 
P2P platform since lenders perceive that the announcement of home-purchase release indicates 
a negative signal for treated houseowners. We could also find that the P2P borrowing interest 
rates for treated households without house has No significant differences compared to those of 
control regions. As a result, the 2014 house purchase release policy has a counter effect on P2P 
borrowing costs compared to the 2016 house purchase restriction policy. This result supports 
our main findings and mechanism while further alleviating potential time trends of the city 
effects on the changes of the P2P borrowing costs in 2016 shock. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
6.3 The Impact of the 2016 Home-purchase Release on Houseowners based on Borrower 
Fixed Effects 
Although we apply DID estimation based on three exogenous shocks to account for the 
potential endogeneity, a concern related to the repeated cross-sectional nature of tour P2P 
lending data setting is still valid, since we still suffer from the omitted variable bias from 
various possible unobserved individual characteristics. Therefore, we carry a serious of 
robustness checking estimations by adding borrower’s fixed effect to alleviate the endogeneity 
consideration. The equation and the definitions of variables are the same as equation (2). 
However, we only control for loan amount and include city and borrower fixed effects, with 
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standard errors clustered at the city and borrower level to account for any correlations of the 
error terms within each firm. The borrower’s fixed effect targets on the same person who 
participated in the P2P lending market both before and after the shocks. The robustness test 
result from Table 11 confirms that our main conclusions remain unchanged, the borrowing 
costs drops 5.2% after the 2016 house purchase restriction policy compared to this house 
owner’s borrowing costs before the 2016 policy, while the borrowing costs increase 46.8% 
after the 2014 house purchase release policy compared to this houseowner’s borrowing costs 
before the 2014 policy. This result suggests that our previous results are Not driven by the 
unobserved time-invariant personal characteristics. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 
6.4 Winsorized Interest Rate and Loan Amount 
To account for the consideration that the extreme observations in borrowing interest rates and 
loan amount might gave an impact on the main research results the 95% and 99% winsorization 
over borrowing interest rates and loan amount was applied into the previous DiD settings in 
cities with and without implementing 2016 house purchase restriction policies. The result is 
robust with the previous finding as shown in Table 12.  
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
 
6.5 Weighted Regression by Cities’ Transactions 
To account for the concerns that the numbers of observations in different cities is unbalanced, 
we conduct robustness test by giving weights for the number of observations in different cities. 
As shown in Table 13, based on the weighted numbers of observation in different cities, the 
research results are robust with the previous findings.  
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
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6.6 The Speed of Crowdfunding, Number of Investors per loan and the Probability of a 
Successful Loan 
Admittedly, our results are all equilibrium loan interest rates that formed by both borrowers 
and lenders in the P2P market, and we hypothesize such reduction in interest rate is mainly 
driven by the borrowers rather than the internal algorithm of the P2P platform.  To answer this 
question, we attempt to isolate the lenders’ reactions. In particular, we test how the speed of 
crowdfunding, number of investors per loan and the probability of a successful funding were 
affected after the restriction policy. We still apply the previous DD settings for these three tests. 𝑑𝑢𝑟_𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2016𝑖 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 +    𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡  (12) 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 +  𝛽3ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒+𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡  (13) 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2016𝑖 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 +𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡  (14) 
Where   𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡,  𝑑𝑢𝑟_𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑡 are the numbers of lenders who invest their funds 
to achieve borrowers’ funding goal and duration of the P2P borrowing activities. And success 
is a dummy variable with one as household successfully funded from P2P platform while zero 
fails. For equation (12) (13), the definitions of variables are the same as equation (2). 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents a full set of city, month, year, and job characteristics fixed effects, with standard 
errors clustered at the city and month*year level to account for any correlations of the error 
terms within each firm. The estimation result from Table 15 shows that the speed of 
crowdfunding is 3.556 minutes less for treated houseowners compared with controlled ones 
after the shock, which demonstrates that treated houseowners could borrow significantly faster 
in the P2P platform compared with their counterparts due to the home-purchase restriction. In 
addition, the estimation result from Table 15 shows that the number of lenders per loan increase 
by 9.3 for the treated houseowners, which shows that more lenders are inclined to invest their 
money to the treated borrowers after the shock. This result echoes to our main finding regarding 
the advantages that treated houseowners could achieve after the shock and responds to the 
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previous theories of house borrowing collateral effect since housing value has also been seen 
as an explicit asset valued by banks or other financial intermediations.  
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
 
For equation (14), Controli is the control variable that includes interest rate or borrowing 
amount. 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents city, year, month and borrower fixed effects, with two-way standard 
error clustered at both borrower and city level. The definitions of the other variables are the 
same as equation (2). We only use borrower fixed effect since we only eye on the borrowers 
who borrow before and after the policy shock. This could avoid the inconsistent borrowing 
behaviors before and after the shock. Other variables and sets follow those stated before. Since 
the data of success rate could only be access before 2016, we only target on the 2014 home-
purchase release policy. The estimation result from Table 16 shows that success rate for treated 
P2P household borrowing activities drop 2.2% compared to the control group. This result 
echoes to our main finding regarding the lenders perceives as a negative effect for treated 
houseowners’ house value after the shock and thus lenders are less inclined to respond to in 
the treated borrowers’ borrowing requests. 
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
 
VII. Discussion  
the Effect of the 2016 House-purchase Restriction on P2P household default rates 
Our previous study only evaluates the advantages that the affected household might be 
perceived by the lenders after the policy shock. We also like to see the borrowers’ actual post 
performance after the shock. Therefore, we target on P2P household default rates conditioning 
on the success of a deal. We still apply the previous DD settings for these three tests. 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_2016𝑖 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2016𝑖 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑎𝑠_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒  +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡  (15) 
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Where 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 is 1 represents P2P borrowers with P2P defaults and 0 otherwise, the 
definitions of variables are the same as equation (2). 𝛼𝑖𝑟𝑡 represents a full set of city, month, 
year, and job characteristics fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the city and 
month*year level to account for any correlations of the error terms within each firm. The 
estimation result from Table 17 shows that P2P borrowers have 0.1% less defaults after the 
2016 home-purchase release policy. This result echoes to our main finding regarding the 
advantages that treated houseowners could achieve after the shock, which makes them less 
likely to default.  
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
 
VIII. Conclusion  
Household borrowing costs and related activities in P2P lending platform are subject to great 
variations for diverse reasons. Government policies are often the causes to create such 
distortions. Based on a quasi-natural experiment in the announcement of home-purchase 
restriction policies in multiple of cities in China in late September and early October, our study 
uses a series of DD and DDD models to estimate the impact house-purchase restriction policy 
on houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates. We identify that home-purchase restriction is 
perceived by the lenders as a positive signal for borrowers increasing house value, which is led 
to decrease treated houseowners’ P2P borrowing interest rates and slowing down the speed of 
the P2P crowdfunding, while increasing the number of lenders per loan who fund this 
borrowing requests through the channel of borrowing collateral effect. Since the home-
purchase restriction policy implies the increase of the house wealth for the houseowners, lends 
would consider that houseowners tend to have a higher borrowing collateral value that 
decreases their default risks and strengthen their financial position in the financial market.  We 
further proxy the heterogenous effect of city macroeconomic conditions as housing price 
appreciation potential on the policy shock. The results show that P2P interest rates decrease 
sharper for treated houseowners whose cities have a higher GDP growth rate, population 
growth rate, and residential investment growth rate. Therefore, economic growth of the city is 
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able to increase the house value, which offers household a stronger financial position and more 
advantages in the P2P borrowing activities. This estimation further comfirms the collateral 
effect. 
The further estimation considering household loans and age confirms the borrowing 
collateral effect that houseowners with borrowing constraints benefit more from the policy 
effect while age profile does Not make significant impacts on this relationship. In addition, we 
use the 2014 home-purchase release policy as a counter shock of the 2016 home-purchase 
release policy. The results reverse the findings from 2016 shock and confirms the borrowing 
collateral effect of the variation of the borrowing costs. The robustness check results using 
borrower fixed effects and land supply as instrumental variable also support our findings.  
Our research contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of government housing 
policies on households and investors at the Chinese online micro-financing market. We 
examine the collateral channel of the house wealth effect on household borrowing activities 
based on housing price swings. We also shed new light on the individual and city factors 
influencing P2P borrowing activities by connecting macro-economic shocks with micro-
financing variations. 
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Table 1 The Specific Date of Restrictive House-purchase Policy for 21 cities in 2016 
City Name Restrictions Date 
Beijing 30-09-2016 
Tianjing 01-10-2016 
Langfang 01-04-2016 
Shanghai 27-05-2016 
Nanjing 26-09-2016 
Wuxi 02-10-2016 
Suzhou 04-10-2016 
Hangzhou 28-09-2016 
Hefei 02-10-2016 
Fuzhou 07-10-2016 
Xiamen 06-10-2016 
Nanchang 08-10-2016 
Jinan 03-10-2016 
Zhengzhou 01-10-2016 
Wuhan 03-10-2016 
Guangzhou 04-10-2016 
Shenzhen 04-10-2016 
Zhuhai 04-10-2016 
Foshan 07-10-2016 
Dongguan 07-10-2016 
Chengdu 01-10-2016 
 
Source: Cao et.al, (2015) 
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Source: Cao et.al, (2015)
Table 2 The Specific Date of Restrictive House-purchase Policy Relief for 35 
cities in 2014 
 
City Name Restrictions Relief Date 
Nanjing 21-09-2014 
Hangzhou 29-08-2014 
Tianjin 01-08-2014 
Zhengzhou 09-08-2014 
Chengdu 22-07-2014 
Wuxi 30-08-2014 
Hefei 02-08-2014 
Jinan 10-07-2014 
Wuhan 24-09-2014 
Xiamen 01-07-2014 
Fuzhou 01-08-2014 
Nanchang 12-08-2014 
Shijiazhuang 26-09-2014 
Taiyuan 04-08-2014 
Hohhot 24-06-2014 
Shenyang 10-06-2014 
Dalian 03-09-2014 
Changchun 19-07-2014 
Harbin 16-08-2014 
Xuzhou 01-08-2014 
Ningbo 30-07-2014 
Wenzhou 30-07-2014 
Jinhua 01-08-2014 
Qingdao 01-08-2014 
Changsha 06-08-2014 
Nanning 01-10-2014 
Haikou 22-07-2014 
Sanya 07-10-2014 
Guiyang 01-09-2014 
Kunming 11-08-2014 
Xian 01-09-2014 
Lanzhou 03-09-2014 
Xining 10-09-2014 
Yinchuan 22-08-2014 
Urumqi 01-08-2014 
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Figure 1 Housing price index fluctuation over 2010-2016 
The figure plots the housing price index and month-on-month growth rate over 2010-
2016 for 70 cities. Restricted cities are the cities implementing the housing purchase 
restriction policy between September of 2010 and March of 2011. Data is from 
WIND database.  
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Figure 2 Dynamic effects of HRP on the Interest Rate of Borrowers with Houses 
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
This table presents summary the mean for characteristics of funded loans, borrowers and 
cities in the pretreatment periods (1 Jan 2016 and 26 Sep 2016). Data on loans, borrowers 
is from Renrendai P2P platform. City characteristic data is from CSMAR. Standard 
deviations are in brackets. For The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, 
** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Has house  Has No house All sample 
 
Control Treated Difference 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) 
amount 87332.88 97766.27 -10433.4*** 
 
74255.82 82832.55 
 
(46853.46) (51866.5) 
  
(46240.19) (48134.89) 
interest 10.287 10.263 0.030*** 
 
10.161 10.225 
 
(0.479) (0.488) 
  
(0.51) (0.499) 
Duration(hour) 9.818 11.205 -1.392*** 
 
11.519 10.81 
 
(16.418) (18.795) 
  
(19.097) (18.071) 
No. investor 113.468 130.114 -16.600*** 
 
100.215 109.806 
 
(130.61) (147.412) 
  
(124.655) (130.981) 
gender 0.311 0.299 0.012*** 
 
0.34 0.323 
 
(0.463) (0.458) 
  
(0.474) (0.468) 
age 38.362 37.514 0.850*** 
 
34.531 36.465 
 
(8.547) (8.258) 
  
(8.196) (8.539) 
graduation 1.27 1.392 -0.122*** 
 
1.277 1.291 
 
(0.717) (0.682) 
  
(0.681) (0.697) 
married 0.763 0.756 0.007 
 
0.608 0.69 
 
(0.426) (0.43) 
  
(0.488) (0.462) 
houseLoan 0.539 0.624 -0.085*** 
 
0 0.302 
 
(0.498) (0.484) 
  
(0) (0.459) 
workYears 2.161 2.044 0.117*** 
 
1.837 1.994 
 
(1.022) (1.045) 
  
(1.072) (1.06) 
salary 3.289 3.941 -0.652*** 
 
3.223 3.355 
 
(1.206) (1.247) 
  
(1.147) (1.211) 
GDP growth 
rate 
0.085 0.091 -0.006*** 
 
0.09 0.088 
 
0.045 0.018 
  
(0.029) (0.035) 
population 
growth rate 
0.003 0.006 -0.002*** 
 
0.007 0.006 
 
(0.012) (0.024) 
  
(0.021) (0.018) 
residential 
investment 
growth rate 
0.092 0.145 -0.053*** 
 
0.128 0.116 
 
(0.145) (0.051) 
  
(0.104) (0.119) 
Observations 34654 13162   41101 88917 
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Table 4 Test common trend prior to policy intervention 
The table reports common trend before the home-purchase restriction policy shock, which 
shows the common trend assumption of DD estimation for all of the households. The 
dependent variable is borrowing cost. treated is a dummy variable with one for the cities 
implementing home-purchase restriction while zero otherwise. Lag_4_Quarters, 
Lag_3_Quarters, Lag_2_Quarters, Lag_1_Quarters is 4 quarters, 3 quarters, 2 quarters, and 
1 quarter before the home-purchase restriction policy shock in each city, respectively. City, 
month*year, job characteristics (office_type, salary, office_size) fixed effects are controlled 
in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city level. Column 1 adds loan amount as 
control variable. Column 2 adds individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, 
graduation) and loan amount as control variables. Column 3 adds individual characteristics 
and city_trend as control variables. Column 4 adds individual characteristics (age, gender, 
has_house, work_year, married graduation), loan amount, and city_trend as control 
variables. The definition of variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag_4_Quarters*treated 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.026 
 
(0.62) (0.62) (0.78) (0.81) 
Lag_3_Quarters*treated -0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.002 
 
(-0.05) (-0.05) (0.19) (0.06) 
Lag_2_Quarters*treated -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 -0.028 
 
(-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.48) (-1.43) 
Lag_1_Quarter*treated -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-0.58) (-0.60) (-0.38) (-0.34) 
Controls (Loan Amount) Yes Yes No Yes 
Controls (Individual 
Characteristics) No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (City Trend) No No Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 454,489 454,489 454,489 454,489 
R-squared 0.788 0.788 0.787 0.791 
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Table 5 The effect of the 2016 housing value fluctuation on borrowing costs 
The table reports the DD and DDD estimation results of the effect of the 2016 house wealth 
fluctuation on the borrowing cost. The results are for the subsample with households having 
house, the subsample with households without house, and the full sample with households with 
or without house. The dependent variable is borrowing costs. Treatpost_2016 is defined as 1 for 
cities after implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. Has_house is defined 
as 1 for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job characteristics 
fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city and 
month*year level. Column (1), (3), (5) are basic regression without any control variables.  
Column (2), (4), (6) add individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, 
graduation) and loan amount as control variables. The definition of the variables refers to 
Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent 
variable=Interest Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatpost_2016 -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.012 0.009 
  
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) 
  
Treatpost_2016 × 
Has house  
    
-0.026*** -0.028*** 
     
(0.009) (0.009) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Controls (Individual 
Characteristics) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,546 100,546 130,313 130,313 215,606 215,606 
R-squared 0.440 0.449 0.392 0.398 0.511 0.519 
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Table 6 Mechanism tests of the effect of housing value change on borrowing costs 
The table shows the results of the mechanism tests of the effect of housing value change on 
borrowing outcomes. The dependent variable is borrowing cost. Column (1) and (3) report DD 
estimation results for subsample with households having house. Column (2) and (4) report 
DDD estimation results for full sample with households with or without house. Treatpost_2016 
is defined as 1 for cities after implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. 
Age is borrowers’ age. Loan is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the household has house loan 
or car loan and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job characteristics fixed effects are 
controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city and month*year level. 
Individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, graduation) and loan amount are 
added as control variables. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and 
* stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Treatpost_2016 × Loan -0.042*** 
   
 
(0.011) 
 
   
Treatpost_2016 × Has 
house × Loan 
 
-0.065*** 
  
  
(0.019) 
 
  
Treatpost_2016 × Age 
  
0.001 
 
   
(0.000) 
 
 
Treatpost_2016 × Has 
house × Age 
   
0.001 
    
(0.000) 
 Controls (Loan Amount) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (Individual 
Characteristics) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96,062 215,606 96,062 215,606 
R-squared 0.547 0.519 0.546 0.519 
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Table 7 Heterogeneity of the 2016 house value effect on borrowing costs: city 
characteristics 
The table presents heterogeneous effect of the house value change from city characteristics. The 
dependent variable is borrowing cost. The results are for sub-sample with households having 
house(s). Treatpost_2016 is defined as 1 for cities after implementing 2016 home-purchase 
restriction and 0 otherwise. GDP Growth, Population Growth Rate, and investment Growth Rate 
is the GDP, population, and fixed assets investment growth rate at each city, respectively. City, 
year, month, and job characteristics fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard 
errors are clustered at city and month*year level. Column (1), (3), (5) are basic regression 
without any control variables.  Column (2), (4), (6) add individual characteristics (age, gender 
work_year, married, graduation) and loan amount as control variables. The definition of the 
variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
   Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatpost_2016 × 
GDP Growth Rate -0.170*** -0.264*** 
    
 
(0.037) (0.087) 
    
Treatpost_2016 × 
Population 
Growth Rate 
  
-0.062*** -0.001 
  
   
(0.016) (0.041) 
  
Treatpost_2016 × 
Investment 
Growth Rate 
    
-0.069*** -0.071*** 
     
(0.002) (0.008) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Controls 
(Individual 
Characteristics) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job 
Characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 98,394 98,394 98,394 98,394 98,394 98,394 
R-squared 0.437 0.446 0.437 0.446 0.437 0.446 
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Table 8 Instrument Variable test on Borrowing Cost 
This Table shows the IV test of House Restriction Policy on online borrowing cost. 
Construction Land Supply and Planned Construction Land Supply are employed as 
Instrumental variables for Treatpost_2016, which is defined as 1 for cities after 
implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job 
characteristics fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at 
city and month*year level. Individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, 
graduation) and loan amount are control variables. The definition of the variables refers to 
Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
   Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate 
IV=Construction Land 
Supply 
IV=Planned 
Construction Land 
Supply 
IV=Planned 
Construction Land 
Supply & 
Construction Land 
Supply 
        
Treatpost_2016 -0.781*** -0.781*** -0.781*** 
 
(0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Controls (Loan Amount) Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (Individual 
Characteristics) Yes Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 136,357 136,357 136,357 
R-squared -0.282 -0.282 -0.282 
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Table 9: 2014 Relief Event (Test common trend) 
The table reports common trend before the 2014 home-purchase release policy shock, which 
shows the common trend assumption of DD estimation for all of the households. The 
dependent variable is borrowing cost. treated is a dummy variable with one for the cities 
implementing home-purchase restriction while zero otherwise. Lag_4_Quarters, 
Lag_3_Quarters, Lag_2_Quarters, Lag_1_Quarters is 4 quarters, 3 quarters, 2 quarters, and 1 
quarter before the 2014 home-purchase release policy shock in each city, respectively. City, 
month*year, job characteristics (office_type, salary, office_size) fixed effects are controlled 
in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city level. Column 1 adds loan amount as 
control variable. Column 2 adds individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, 
graduation) and loan amount as control variables. Column 3 adds individual characteristics 
and city_trend as control variables. Column 4 adds individual characteristics (age gender 
has_house work_year married graduation), loan amount, and city_trend as control variables. 
The definition of variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
    Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag 4 Quarters -0.076 -0.080 -0.075 -0.056 
 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.066) (0.065) 
Lag 3 Quarters -0.070 -0.072 -0.071 -0.075 
 
(0.081) (0.080) (0.076) (0.079) 
Lag 2 Quarters -0.066 -0.079 -0.076 -0.092** 
 
(0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) 
Lag 1 Quarter 0.000 -0.015 -0.010 -0.053 
 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Controls (Individual 
Characteristics) 
No Yes Yes Yes 
ontrols (City Trend) NO No Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 551,177 551,162 551,162 201,835 
R-squared 0.812 0.815 0.813 0.520 
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Table 10 The effect of the 2014 housing value fluctuation on borrowing cost 
The table reports the DD and DDD estimation results of the effect of the 2014 house wealth 
fluctuation on the borrowing cost. The results are for subsample with households having house, 
subsample with households without house, and the full sample with households with or without 
house. The dependent variable is borrowing cost. Treatpost_2014 is defined as 1 for cities after 
implementing 2014 home-purchase release policy and 0 otherwise. Has_house is defined as 1 
for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job characteristics fixed 
effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city and month*year 
level. Column (1), (3), (5) are basic regression without any control variables.  Column (2), (4), 
(6) add individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, graduation) and loan 
amount as control variables. The definition of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** 
and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatpost_2014 (0.042) (0.036) (0.092) (0.087) 
  
 
(2.28) (2.76) (1.23) (1.20) 
  
Treatpost_2014 × 
Has_house 
    
0.077** 0.075** 
     
(0.034) (0.035) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) 
NO Yes NO Yes NO Yes 
Controls (Individual 
Characteristics) NO Yes NO Yes NO Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 113,130 113,126 95,616 95,611 193,163 193,154 
R-squared 0.505 0.521 0.520 0.529 0.584 0.593 
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Table 11: The effect of the housing value fluctuation on borrowing costs based on 
borrower fixed effects 
The table reports the DD and DDD estimation results of the effect of the house wealth 
fluctuation on borrowing cost. The results are for subsample with households having house, 
subsample with households without house, and the full sample with households with or 
without house. The dependent variable is borrowing costs. Treatpost_2016 is defined as 1 
for cities after implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. 
Treatpost_2014 is defined as 1 for cities after implementing 2014 home-purchase release 
policy and 0 otherwise. Has_house is defined as 1 for P2P household with house and 0 
otherwise. City and borrower fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors 
are clustered at city and borrower level.  loan amount is the control variable. The definition 
of the variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate (1) (2) 
Treatpost_2016 × Has house  -0.052*** 
 
 
(0.018) 
 
Treatpost_2014 × Has house  
 
0.468*** 
  
(0.139) 
Controls (Loan Amount) Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes 
Borrower FE Yes Yes 
Observations 23,871 11,236 
R-squared 0.720 0.654 
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Table 12: Winsorized interest rate and loan amount 
The table reports the robustness check results of the effect of the 2016 house-purchase restriction on P2P household borrowing costs based on 
winsorized interest rate and loan amount. The results are for the subsample with households having house and the full sample with households with 
or without house. Treatpost_2016 is defined as 1 for cities after implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. Has_house is 
defined as 1 for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job characteristics fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. 
Standard errors are clustered at city and month*year level. Column (1), (3), (5) (7) are basic regression without any control variables.  Column (2), 
(4), (6), (8) add individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, graduation) and loan amount as control variables. Column (1) (2) (5) 
(6) winsorize interest rates and loan amount at 95%. Column (3) (4) (7) (8) winsorize interest rates and loan amount at 99%. The definition of 
variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
   Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatpost_2016 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
    
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
Treatpost_2016 × 
Has house 
    
-0.023*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
     
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Controls 
(Individual 
Characteristics) 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,546 100,546 100,546 100,546 215,606 215,606 215,606 215,606 
R-squared 0.460 0.467 0.440 0.450 0.481 0.489 0.513 0.522 
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Table 13: Weighted numbers of observation in different cities 
The table reports the robustness check results of the effect of the 2016 house-purchase 
restriction on P2P household borrowing costs based on the weighted numbers of observation 
in different cities. The results are for the subsample with households having house and No 
house, and the full sample with households with or without house. Treatpost_2016 is defined 
as 1 for cities after implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. Has_house 
is defined as 1 for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job 
characteristics fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at 
city and month*year level. Column (1), (3), (5) (7) are basic regression without any control 
variables.  Column (2), (4), (6), (8) add individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, 
married, graduation) and loan amount as control variables. The definition of variables refers 
to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable 
=Interest Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatpost -0.010*** -0.009*** 0.019* 0.015 
  
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) 
  
Treatpost × Has 
house 
    
-0.031*** -0.031*** 
     
(0.009) (0.009) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Controls 
(Individual 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job 
Characteristics FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.452 0.461 0.389 0.395 0.544 0.551 
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Table 14 The effect of the housing value fluctuation on duration of the P2P 
crowdfunding procedures.  
The table reports the DDD estimation results of the effect of the house wealth fluctuation 
on the duration of the P2P crowdfunding procedures. The dependent variable is duration of 
the P2P crowdfunding procedures in minutes. The results are for full sample with 
households with or without house. Treatpost_2016 is defined as 1 for cities after 
implementing the 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. Has_house is defined as 
1 for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job characteristics 
fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city and 
month*year level. Individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, married, graduation) 
and loan amount are added as control variables. The definition of the variables refers to 
Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Dependent variable 
=Duration_minutes (1) (2) 
Treatpost_2016 × Has house -2.796* -3.556** 
 
(1.592) (1.653) 
Controls (Loan Amount) No Yes 
Controls (Individual 
Characteristics) No Yes 
City FE Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes 
Observations 50,781 50,781 
R-squared 0.012 0.015 
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Table 15 The effect of the housing value fluctuation on the number of investors who 
invest in the P2P crowdfunding procedures 
The table reports the DD and DDD estimation results of the effect of the 2016 house wealth 
fluctuation on the number of investors who invest in the P2P crowdfunding procedures. The 
results are for subsample with households having house, subsample with households without 
house, and the full sample with households with or without house. The dependent variable 
is the number of investors who invest in the P2P crowdfunding procedures. Treatpost_2016 
is defined as 1 for cities after implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. 
Has_house is defined as 1 for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, 
and job characteristics fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are 
clustered at city and month*year level. Column (1), (3), (5) are basic regression without any 
control variables.  Column (2), (4), (6) add individual characteristics (age, gender, 
work_year, married, graduation) and loan amount as control variables. The definition of the 
variables refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  Dependent variable 
=No. of Investors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatpost_2016 5.493 5.689* 10.291*** 3.526 
  
 
(3.994) (2.874) (3.376) (3.028) 
  
Treatpost_2016 × 
Has house 
    
12.883*** 9.300*** 
     
(3.861) (3.013) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Controls 
(Individual 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job 
Characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,546 100,546 130,313 130,313 215,606 215,606 
R-squared 0.079 0.343 0.080 0.310 0.112 0.359 
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Table 16 The effect of the housing value fluctuation on borrowing success rates 
The table reports the DDD estimation results of the effect of the house wealth fluctuation on 
borrowing success rates. The results are for full sample with households with or without 
house. The dependent variable is borrowing success rates. Treatpost_2014 is defined as 1 for 
cities after implementing 2014 home purchase release policy and 0 otherwise. Has_house is 
defined as 1 for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City and borrower fixed effects 
are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city and borrower level.  
loan amount and interest rate are the control variables. The definition of the variables refers 
to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
   Dependent variable 
=Success Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatpost 2014 × Has house 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.017** 0.021*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Controls (Loan Amount) No Yes No Yes 
Controls (Interest) No No Yes Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 227,025 227,025 227,025 227,025 
R-squared 0.630 0.648 0.634 0.651 
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Table 17: Ex-post Default (Late/No Payment) the effect of the 2016 house-purchase 
restriction on P2P household default rates 
The table reports the robustness check results of the effect of the 2016 house-purchase 
restriction on P2P household default rates. The results are for the subsample with 
households having house, the subsample with households having No house, and the full 
sample with households with or without house. The dependent variable is default rate, 
which is 1 with P2P defaults and 0 otherwise. Treatpost_2016 is defined as 1 for cities after 
implementing 2016 home-purchase restriction and 0 otherwise. Has_house is defined as 1 
for P2P household with house and 0 otherwise. City, year, month, and job characteristics 
fixed effects are controlled in all estimations. Standard errors are clustered at city and 
month*year level. Column (1), (3), (5) (7) are basic regression without any control 
variables.  Column (2), (4), (6), (8) add individual characteristics (age, gender, work_year, 
married, graduation) and loan amount as control variables. The definition of variables 
refers to Appendix table. ***, ** and * stand for significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
    Dependent variable 
=Default Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatpost_2016 -0.002* -0.002* 0.000 0.000 
  
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
Treatpost_2016 × 
Has house 
    
-0.001** -0.001** 
     
(0.000) (0.000) 
Controls (Loan 
Amount) No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Controls 
(Individual 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job Characteristics 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,947 99,947 129,802 129,802 214,747 214,747 
R-squared 0.282 0.284 0.063 0.064 0.388 0.388 
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Appendix Table A1: Variable Definitions 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Dependent Variables 
Funding Success A dummy variable with one if the listing posted by a borrower is 
successfully funded; zero otherwise 
Interest Rate The percentage of principle charged by loan platform to a borrower 
Duration of processing Logarithm of minutes took by the borrower of the funding process 
No. of lenders The total number of lenders who are willing to invest on the loan 
Loan amount Logarithm of loan amount received by the borrower. 
Gender A dummy variable with one if the borrower is a female; zero 
otherwise 
Marital Status  A dummy variable with one is married and zero otherwise  
Age The age of the borrower. 
Salary 
A variable indicating a borrower’s monthly income level, where 
n=0 represents whose wage is No more than 1000 RMB, n=1 
means monthly income is between 1000-2000 RMB, n=2 means 
monthly income is between 2000-5000 RMB; n=3 means monthly 
income is between 5000-10000RMB; n=4 means monthly income 
is between 10000-20000RMB; n=5 means monthly income is 
between 20000-50000 RMB; n=6 means monthly income is 
above 50000 RMB. 
Graduation  
A variable indicating the education level of borrowers, where n=0 
(if the borrower is high school certificate and below), n=1 (if the 
borrower is college-degree holder), n=2 (if the borrower is 
university- degree holder), n=3(if the borrower is with 
postgraduate degree and above) 
Has house A dummy variable with one if the borrower owns a house; zero 
otherwise 
House/Car Loan A dummy variable with one if the borrower has either a house loan or a car loan; zero otherwise 
Work Years 
A variable showing the working experience of borrowers, where 
n=0 (if the working experience is No more than 1 year), n=1(if a 
borrower has 1-3 years’ working experience), n=2 ( if a borrower 
has 3-5 years’ working experience), n=3 (if a borrower has more 
than 5 years’ working experience) 
GDP Three-Years’ 
Average Growth Rate 
Three-year （2013-2015）average city GDP growth rate 
Population Two-
Years’ Average 
Growth Rate 
Three-year (2013-2015）average city population growth rate 
Residential Investment 
Three-Years’ Average 
Growth Rate 
Two-year (2014-2015) city residential investment growth rate 
